A growing literature suggests that institutional quality is an important determinant of trade flows. Theoretical models of international trade with incomplete contracts predict that firms will not source intermediate inputs signing arm's length contract if ex-post they cannot enforce the contract. Contract enforcement ultimately depend on the quality of institution. Prior empirical evidence support this idea using cross country data. We study how institutional quality at the local level influences the ability of firms to become international subcontractors using firm-level data. Using a sample of Italian firms and the trial length of civil disputes to proxy for contract enforcement, we find that firms located in courts with higher trial length have a lower probability to supply customized intermediate inputs to foreign firms. JEL: F10, F14, L14 * Bank of Italy. Corresponding author: andrea.linarello@bancaditalia.it. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Bank of Italy. All the remaining errors are our own.
Introduction
Over the past twenty five years structural change in the global economy has occurred as a consequence of the ICT revolution, the steady lowering of trade barriers and transport costs, and the changing nature of multinational enterprises (Feenstra [1998] ). The outcome is a new international division of labor in which the production of final products is fragmented in Global Value Chains (GVC henceforth). Under this new production paradigm, the production process for any given good can be split in tasks assigned to various productive units performed in several places around the world.
GVC are characterized by contractual relationships between producers of intermediate goods and assemblers. In this context contract incompleteness may be pervasive (Antras [2003] ; Antràs and Helpman [2004] ), thus resulting into hold-up problems and intermediate producers' misbehavior. As for the second aspect (that is the focus of this paper) all final firms face the risk that once the contract is signed the foreign supplier has an incentive to reduce its costs and deliver a good that does not satisfy the contractual obligations. Any product incompatibilities or delivery delay can substantially reduce the buyer's profit. Under this perspective contract enforceability plays a relevant role; high quality judiciary institutions might deter intermediate firms' misbehavior: this ultimately is likely to increase intermediate firm participation to GVC, especially when contracts (and products) between are complexity is particularly high.
In this paper we aim at providing evidence that the quality of judiciary may influence firm participation to GVC, by analyzing the census of Italian firms. We show that firms located in courts with higher judicial trial length in civil disputes, which is our measure of contract enforcement, are less likely to supply customized inputs to foreign firms. The effect is stronger in contact-intensive sectors. Our work is the first, to our knowledge, that looks at the impact of contract incompleteness at the local level from the perspective of the exporting firm misbehavior using firm-level data within the same country.
Institutional quality is often assumed to be country specific. Several empirical studies show how contract incompleteness determines trade flows across countries and the pattern of comparative advantages (Anderson and Marcouiller [2002] ; Nunn [2007] ). In a recent paper, Acemoglu and Dell [2009] show that institutions at the local level are a strong determinant of productivity differences within countries. Local institutions can vary greatly in countries with federal systems or within countries where national laws must be enforced by local authorities that influence de facto institutions.
By analyzing the Italian case we take advantage of three important characteristics of the Italian legal system. First, law determines the courts for disputes, that corresponds to the court where the plant is located. This implies that there is no room for the choice of an alternative (more efficient) court when the contract is signed. Second, Italy is characterized by a huge heterogeneity in the quality of local institutions. North-South Italian divide includes financial development (Guiso et al. [2004] ), political accountability (Nannicini et al. [2013] ), workplace productivity (Ichino and Maggi [2000] ), and schooling quality (Angrist et al. [2014] ). Judiciary efficiency is no exception, despite the fact that law should be uniformly applied over the country. Third, the Italian law codifies a specific contract type for the supply of customised intermediate inputs ("contratto di subfornitura"). This contract is widely used in the Italian context (Lazerson [1999] ). In our data, firms report if they supply intermediate inputs to foreign customers under this type of contract, and we use it to measure firm-to-firms relations in a GVC.
Empirically, we are able to document that when firms are located in inefficient courts, the probability to supply intermediate inputs abroad decreases: a one-year increase in trial length is associated with a 0.8 percentage point reduction of this probability. The effect is driven by firms that operate in industries that are contract intensive. For each industry we measure contract intensity as the share of products that are not sold on organized markets according to the Rauch [1999] classification (following Nunn [2007] ). We find that one-year increase in trial length decreases the probability to supply customised inputs by 0.6 to 1.1 percentage points in industries at the 25th and 75th percentile of contract intensity, respectively. This is, to our knowledge, among the few studies that provides firmlevel evidence supporting the predictions of theoretical models of contract enforcement and international trade (see Antràs and Yeaple [2014] for a review of theoretical models). In these models, contract incompleteness shape international trade among firms because of the hold up problem. Driven by the richness of our data, our main focus is on exporting misbehavior. Suppose that two firms located in different countries decide to sign a cash-in-advance contract for the supply of a specialised intermediate input (see Antràs [2014] pp. 78-82 for a detailed discussion). After the contract is signed, and the payment is received, the exporter can increase its profits by reducing production costs. In the extreme case, the exporter maximizes its ex post profits if no production takes place at all. The exporter incentive to deviate from its contractual obligations depends on the punishment it will incur if the importer recurs to a court to enforce the contract. When the exporter is punished with certainty, it has no incentive to deviate, otherwise the importer faces ex-ante contract insecurity. In this particular setting, the quality of institutions that matters is the one of the exporter country. This is true even when the contract specifies a choiceof-law clause. Local courts may be unwilling to enforce a contract signed between residents of two countries, particularly if unfavorable to the local firms.
The bulk of the empirical literature on contract incompleteness and international trade (see Nunn and Trefler [2013] for a detailed review of the empirical literature) uses cross country data. Anderson and Marcouiller [2002] show that contract incompleteness can be an important determinate of international trade. Nunn [2007] and Levchenko [2007] , further develop this idea and show that countries with better institutional quality have a comparative advantage in the production of goods that are contract intensive. Helpman et al. [2008] estimate a gravity equation to show that countries that share the same legal institutions have a higher probability of establish trade relationships. The use of cross country data can be problematic because there two possible sources of institutional quality heterogeneity. Countries have different legal system and they differ in institutional enforcement. Our focus on a single country has the advantage of keeping the legal system fixed, while allowing us to focus on the impact of de facto institutions within country in the level of law enforcement.
Few other works explore the relationship between the quality of institution and international trade using firm-level data. Using data from 28 developing countries, Ma et al. [2010] show that firms located in areas with better institutional quality export more goods that are contract intensive. They results replicates Nunn [2007] finding using firm level data. Araujo et al. [2012] show that the importer country's institutional quality affects the export of Belgian firms. In a similar approach, Aeberhardt et al. [2014] use French firm-level data to show that better institutional quality improves the persistence of trade relationship for firms operating in industries with severe contracting problems. All these studies, although from different perspectives, assume that institutional quality is country specific.
Our paper also contributes the the literature on the importance of institutions in determining economic outcomes (Acemoglu et al. [2001] ; Acemoglu et al. [2005] ). Acemoglu and Dell [2009] document substantial within-country income per capita and productivity differences and show that local institutional quality is an important determinant of such differences. In our paper, we show that local institutions are a determinant of exporting behavior.
The reminder of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we introduce the Italian legal system. In section 3 and 4, we describe the data and the identification strategy. Section 5 discusses the results.
Background and the Italian legal framework
To see exactly how contract enforcement in the exporter country can affect the supply of customized intermediate inputs, consider a simple cash in advance contract (Antràs [2014] ). At t 0 an exporter F agrees to ship q ij at price s ij , to be be paid at t 0 . The following period, at t 1 , the goods are shipped from country i to country j where the importer M sells the goods and collects revenues q ij p ij .
1 With contractual frictions the exporter can increase profits deviating from the contract by producing a lower quality output, by delaying the delivery of the goods or, in an extreme case, by not delivering the good at all. The incentive to deviate from the contract 1 In this particular setting, without contractual frictions the amount to be paid in the first period is equal to the collected revenues s ij = q ij p ij and all surplus goes to the exporter.
will depend on the probability to be sued and lose (λ exp ij ) and the damage to be paid (d exp ij ), which both depend on the quality of institutions in the exporter country. When the cost from deviating is lower than the value of the contract d exp ij λ exp ij < s ij the exporter will deviate and generate profit losses to the importer.
This issue is exacerbated when goods are characterized by a high degree of contract complexity, consider for example, the case of an aircraft fuselage. The production of such a good requires investments that are relationshipspecific by the suppliers and the buyer. The buyer might need to invest in machinery and technology which are complementary to its own knowhow and necessary to deliver the intermediate input according to the buyer needs. The buyer might need to share its industrial blueprint and organize the production according to the contractual agreements with the supplier of the fuselage. The value of these investments are high within the buyersupplier relationship than outside the relationship. The buyer may decide to assign intermediate input production according to the quality of law enforcement in the supplier country. It follows that firms are more likely to supply customized intermediate input within a GVC when they are located in areas with better contract enforcement.
Contract enforcement varies extensively also within countries. Suppose that in country i there are two firms located in different areas c and c which differs in the level of contract enforcement λ exp ijc > λ exp i jc . Because it is easiest to enforce a contract in c than in c , the importer finds more risky to sign a contract with a firm located in court c . To overcome this problem, the rules of international private law allow the parties to agree on either a tribunal or an arbitration court and to empower it to judge on any controversy arising from the contract. Such courts must not necessarily be located within the jurisdiction of either the buyer's or the supplier's tribunal. Once a verdict is issued, however, the local court of the supplier may still play a role in enforcing the sentence, in particular, local courts might be reluctant to damage a domestic business in favor of a foreign firms.
In this study we will focus on the case of Italy which provide a perfect empirical setting. First, in the Italian system the enforcement of the sentence is carried out by the local court and there is no choice-of-law clause. Article 26 of the Italian Code of Civil Procedure states that the court responsible for enforcement is the one where the majority of the firm's properties are located, i.e. the court in charge of enforcement is determined by the location of the supplier. If that court is inefficient, the buyer may foresee a substantial reduction of its profits, arising from both the incentive of the supplier to deviate from the contract and the delayed compensation in case of controversy. Second, Italy has 165 tribunal jurisdiction areas, whose boundaries has been set in 1865 after the italian unification, and that display large differences in contract enforcement. According to doing business, the average Italy city ranks 155 out of 185 countries measured by doing business in terms of contract enforcement, and there is substantial variation between courts: it might take form 855 days in Turin to more than 2,022 days in Bari to enforce a contract. Finally, in our data, firms report if they supply intermediate inputs to foreign customers under the so called "contratto di subfornitura", which is a specific contract codified by the Italian law and widely used in the Italian context (Lazerson [1999] ) for the supply of customised intermediate inputs.
Data description
In our empirical exercise, we merge the firm-level data coming from the 9 th Census of Industry and Services of 2011 and the information on the efficiency of civil justice provided by the Italian Ministry of Justice.
We use a special section of the Census, which has been administered to the universe of firms with 20 or more employees and to a representative sample of the firms between 10 and 20 employees. This section collects detailed data on the exporting behavior of 48,056 industrial firms; more specifically, we are able to observe whether a firm supplies customized intermediate inputs to foreign companies (we will label these firms as "international subcontractors" in what follows).
2 When the firm belongs to a foreign group, we are also able to know if the majority of these supplies were realized on behalf of other firms of the group; in that case, the firm is dropped from the sample, since our contract incompleteness argument does not apply within the boundaries of a group. Our database contains 10,192 firms supplying customized goods to foreign firms outside their group. These pieces of information are integrated by other data on the firm's location, sector of activity, number of employees, revenues and value added.
On the other hand, data on the actual duration of civil proceedings are not directly available. We build a proxy of the average civil trial length, using the caseflow data provided by the Ministry of Justice.
3 For each of the 165 Italian judicial districts, we calculate the index as follows:
where P are pending cases at the beginning of the year, F are the new cases filed throughout the year, and E are the cases ended with a judicial decision or withdrawn by the parties during the year. The data only refer to ordinary civil proceedings and are expressed in years. In order to get rid of possible idiosyncratic volatility in the series of trial length, we take the average of the index between 2002 and 2007 as our measure of institutional quality.
Since we expect the effect of local courts' efficiency on the probability of engaging in international subcontracting to scale up with the contract intensity of the goods provided, we interact the index of trial duration with a sectoral index of relationship specificity derived from the Rauch's classification [Rauch, 1999] . We measure the contract intensity as the share of differentiated products produced within each sector, using both the liberal and the conservative classification. Table 1 contains some basic statistics on our sample of firms. The average size in terms of employees is 49.7, while average revenues and value added amount to roughly 12.7 and 2.8 million Euros; the average value added per worker amounts to 46.6 thousand Euros. 65% of the firms in our sample is an exporter; a slightly lower percentage of firms is engaged in subcontracting activities, but only 22.1% does it abroad. It has to be noted that most of the firms operate in contract-intensive sectors, as captured by an average Rauch index above 80% under both definitions.
In table 2, we show how firm characteristics vary with the exporting status. In line with the theory, domestic firms are on average smaller and less productive, while exporters are characterised by the largest average size (both in terms of employees and revenues) and by the highest value added per worker. In a similar fashion, international subcontractors are larger and more productive than domestic ones, though being comparable to firms not selling customized goods on most dimensions. Most interestingly for our purposes, domestic producers are on average located in judicial districts characterised by a higher length of civil proceedings; this pattern also holds for international suppliers, located in better courts than domestic suppliers and firms not involved in subcontracting, hinting at a potential role played by local court efficiency on the exporting behaviour of a firm.
To further explore this point, Figure 1 displays two maps highlighting the geographical distribution of subcontractors and the duration of civil proceedings by judicial district. The comparison of the two panels reveals a relevant negative correlation between the two variables. Subcontracting is more frequent in the North and the Centre, and is limited to very narrow zones of the South, which is instead characterised by a longer duration of civil trials. The same correlation can be explored in a regression framework: table 3 displays the results of a court-level regression of the share of international subcontractors on the average duration of civil trials. The correlation is negative, meaning that less efficient courts are associated with a lower share of international suppliers, and remains significant even when controlling for a North-South dummy; significance vanishes when controlling for region fixed effects, though the coefficient remains negative even under this more demanding specification.
Identification Strategy

Baseline regression
To see exactly how contract enforcement can affect the probability for a firm to participate to a GVC we estimate the following equation:
where y isc is a dummy indicating whether firm i, located in area (court) c, and operating in sector s has engaged in international subcontracting. T L c is a measure of quality of law enforcement (trial length, measured in days) in court c; the higher T L c the more inefficient is the court. CI s proxies for the contract intensity of sector s, as computed by Rauch [1999] . D c and D s are a set of area and sector dummies. X isc is a matrix containing firm level controls. In this equation the access to GVC is explained by the interaction between an industry characteristic with an area characteristic. This resembles the empirical specification used by Rajan and Zingales [1998] to test the relationship between financial development and dependence on external financing, and by Nunn [2007] in his study on law enforcement as a source of country level comparative advantages.
We expect β ≤ 0 if court inefficiency (long trial length) negatively impacts the probability of a firm to engage in international subcontracting in contract-intensive sectors, holding fixed all other characteristics. These characteristics include industry and area features and a bunch of firm level controls (log of the number of employees and dummy variables equal to one for exporting and subcontracting firms).
Discussion
A few things should be noted in the estimation of equation (2).
Given the nature of our data, we are not able to exploit any source of exogenous variability. This implies that the causal interpretation of β rests on the discussion of potential sources of biases in our estimates.
First of all, there could be omitted variables which may influence both trial length and the access to GVC. For example contract intensive sectors are generally more skilled-labor intensive, that is a crucial determinant for the access to international markets and, in Italy, is concentrated in areas in where the law enforcement is more efficient (North); this may create a downward bias in the estimate of β. For this reasons, we control for other determinants of international subcontracting like size, exporting status, and the choice to produce customized inputs (dummy for subcontracting firms). Note that these controls may, in principle, bias toward zero our estimated parameter as both exporting activities and subcontracting are influenced by trial length. In other words, our correction for the omitted variable bias may lead to the use of potential bad controls (i.e. outcome variables). For this reason we present the estimates both with and without controls, and we show that estimated effects remain basically unchanged. The second issue relates to reverse causality. Areas in which international sourcing is very diffuse may successfully lobby the Italian Ministry of Justice to maintain a good contracting environment by keeping there the most efficient judges, court officers and clerks, thus negatively affecting β. While we cannot exclude this occurrence, this issue looks much more relevant in cross-country analyses rather than in within country regressions. The reason is that, in Italy, decisions on the composition of local courts are made by the High Council of the Judiciary (HCJ);
4 HJC decides according to the dispositions of two major laws: the first is the Royal Decree n. 12 issued on January 30th, 1941, the second is Law 195, published on March 24th, 1958. Both laws were issued in a completely different economic setting, well before problems related to international sourcing could even arise. To be sure, HCJ still retains some discretionary powers in the assignment of judges; yet HCJ is an extremely independent body, its autonomy is warranted by the Constitution and jealously defended by its components. The third is relative to the problems of sorting or self-selection. Firms with an intense international contracting activities might be induced to relocate in areas in which courts are more efficient. This would generate a negative bias in β. We can test this issue by checking whether areas with a better quality of law enforcement tend to be more specialized in contract-intensive sectors. Figure 2 plots the average contract intensity at court level against the average trial length.
5 We use both liberal and conservative definition of contract intensity as defined by Rauch [1999] . It is apparent that the correlation between the two measures is zero thus rejecting the sorting hypothesis.
Results
Baseline results are reported in Table 4 . The coefficient of interest is the one attached to trial length, which is our measure of institutional quality. It remains negative and significant throughout all the specifications, though slightly reducing in magnitude as geographic and firm level controls are added. The latter include a measure log of employees (as a measure of size) and value added per worker (as a measure of productivity); both size and productivity are crucial variables to understand the role of firms on international markets. We also control for a dummy equal to one if the firm operates as a supplier of customized goods either home or abroad, as a control for the self-selection in to the supplier status; for a similar reason, we include a dummy for exporters. As discussed in section 4, however, these two dummies could be bad controls and are likely to downward bias the parameter of interest. Even under this most requiring specification, the estimate remains negative and significant: an increase of one year in trial length would reduce the probability of supplying customized inputs abroad by 0.8 percentage points. As expected, size and productivity positively correlate with the probability to be engaged in international subcontracting; similarly, having signed a contract of (domestic or international) subfornitura or being an exporter also have a positive impact on the participation to a GVC. We then explore the possibility that the effects of institutional quality on the participation to GVCs may be heterogeneous, depending on the contract intensiveness of the industry in which the firm operates. To test that, we implemented the specification in equation 2; the results are displayed in table 5. Column (1) reports the estimates for the most parsimonious specification, including trial length, contract intensity and their interaction, along with a set of sector fixed effects. The coefficient on trial length remains negative, while the one on Rauch's measure is positive, as expected. Most importantly, the coefficient on the interaction term is negative and significant, hinting at an heterogeneous effect associated with contract intensity: low contract enforcement has a detrimental effect on the participation to GVCs, and this is stronger in industries characterized by a higher contract intensity. As more geographic and firm controls are added, the significance of the coefficient on trial length vanishes, while the one on the interaction term remains negative and significant throughout. Similar results are obtained when we look at the conservative version of Rauch classification.
As for the magnitude of the coefficients, a one-year increase in trial length reduces the probability to operate as an international subcontractor by 0.6 percentage points for firms belonging to sectors at the 25th percentile of the (liberal) Rauch classification; the fall amount to 1.1 percentage points for industries at the 75th percentile. A similar magnitude can be obtained when we look at the conservative definition. Table 6 presents the first set of robustness checks. Dependent variable in equation 2 equals to one if the firm is an international subcontractor; zero is instead attributed to both domestic firms and exporters which do not operate in a GVC. A possible concern relates to the fact that the negative coefficient found actually depends on the self-selection into the exporter status, thus detecting a mere Nunn [2007] effect. A similar argument may apply to the self-selection into the subcontractor status. In order to reject this hypotheses, we re-run our estimates on exporters only (columns (1) and (2) of table 6) and on subcontractors only (columns (3) and (4)). The estimates are robust to these sample cuts, remaining negative and significant with a point estimate very close to the previous results. The sole coefficient on the interaction suffers a loss of significance when restricting the sample to exporters; however, this may be due to reduced variability of the Rauch index, linked to the fact that most of the exporters operate in contract-intensive industries.
Another possible concern is that we could be capturing a mere NorthSouth effect, tough we are conditioning for geographic variables in our regressions. The results in table 7, obtained restricting the sample to firms located in the Centre-North, show that this is not the case: the estimates remain negative, significant and similar in magnitude to the previous ones.
A conspicuous concern relates to the presence of multi-plant firms. In section 2 we have discussed that in that case the court in charge of the execution may vary according to the relative size of the firm's assets across plants. The Census collects information on the number of plants belonging to each firm, and this allows us to exclude multi-plant firms from our analysis, in order to control for the potential identification problems related to the multilocalization of assets. Results are presented in table 8. Columns (1) and (2) report the estimates of equation 2 without interaction, while columns (3) and (4) add heterogeneous effects. Estimates confirm the attenuation bias due to measurement error: point estimates are slightly larger in modulus than the baseline ones.
Finally, we check whether local institutions have an effect on the exporter status as well. Table 9 replicates the previous specifications, using the dummy for exporters as a dependent variable. Results are similar in sign and significance, but are much stronger in magnitude. This applies both to the specification with trial length alone and to the one with the interaction with the Rauch measure. In the latter case, one year increase in trial length would reduce the probability of being an exporter by 2.5 percentage points for firms at the 25th percentile of the (liberal) Rauch classification, and by 4.1 percentage points for those at the 75th percentile. Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy for firms exporting customized goods. As a measure of contract intensity, we use the Rauch index in its liberal version; results do not vary when the conservative version is used. Sector fixed effects defined according to the Ateco2007 classification at 2 digits; industry fixed effects are instead defined at 4 digits. Standard errors in brackets clustered at the court level. Significance level: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy for firms exporting customized goods.
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In the interaction term we use the Rauch index in its liberal version, as a measure of contract intensity; results do not vary when the conservative version is used. Industry fixed effects defined according to the Ateco2007 classification at 4 digits. Standard errors in brackets clustered at the court level. Significance level: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy for firms exporting customized goods.
In the interaction term we use the Rauch index in its liberal version, as a measure of contract intensity; results do not vary when the conservative version is used. Industry fixed effects defined according to the Ateco2007 classification at 4 digits. Standard errors in brackets clustered at the court level. Significance level: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy for exporters. In the interaction term we use the Rauch index in its liberal version, as a measure of contract intensity; results do not vary when the conservative version is used. Sector fixed effects defined according to the Ateco2007 classification at 2 digits; industry fixed effects are instead defined at 4 digits. Standard errors in brackets clustered at the court level. Significance level: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
